Abstract
Introduction
The European Union regards free movement of labour as one of its four 'basic pillars' and migration between member states is generally depicted as a positive feature of the single market, valued as 'one of the fundamental freedoms of European citizens and for its contribution to a better functioning of labour markets' (European commission, 2006: 17) .
Following the unanticipated outflow of labour from new EU member states after their accession in 2004, the Commission acknowledged that while 'expected mobility from the three Baltic countries and Poland is significantly higher than that from the rest of the Member States…this is unlikely to pose major and lasting challenges for the labour markets of the receiving countries (European Commission, 2006: 17) . Nowhere has this assertion been more debateable than in Sweden, where the presence of labour from the Baltic new EU member state of Latvia, provoked a watershed industrial dispute over the right of Swedish trade unions to apply the collective agreement current in the construction industry. The arrival of East European workers has been accompanied by the contentious issue of 'social dumping', most notably, in the so-called Laval case.
The fact that the Latvian workers were posted in Sweden, without the intention to enter permanently into the Swedish labour market, was very significant. It meant that a dispute over the manner of setting the wages of posted workers could be referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which would have to decide whether the dispute was about exporting labour or the freedom to provide services. From a perspective of securing freedom of services, which would allow a new EU member state company to compete in old member state markets, Roger Blanpain has recently asked: 'Was the industrial action, namely the boycott of Laval by the Swedish unions compatible with freedom of services? The Court said no, and rightly so' (Blanpain, 2009: xxii) . This article will argue, however, not only is the legal analysis of the ECJ contentious, but that the outcome of the case will have a strong bearing on industrial relations in Sweden, and by implication, on those member state systems which rely on strong labour market actors to set labour standards secured within a framework of voluntary collective bargaining. The implications of the Laval case for key aspects of labour standards therefore, reach beyond issues of preserving the 'Swedish model' of industrial relations and pose wider questions about the future of European industrial relations.
The ECJ has delivered a series of rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and the Luxemburg cases that directly address the right to defend existing standards of employment against erosion of wages and conditions. In the first two cases, the rulings were directed towards issues of the legitimate scope of trade union collective bargaining and industrial action; in the latter two, the subjects were regional government and the state. Each of the decisions is considered as hostile to labour rights (Notre Europe, 2008) . The Court is seen to have privileged the economic priorities of the Europe, in particular, treaty provisions on freedom of provision of services and the freedom of establishment of undertakings, over a 'social dimension'. Moreover, paradoxically, the Court would appear to have done so, even though explicitly affirming the right to industrial action as a 'fundamental right' (Ashiagbor, 2009) .
A substantial academic literature has emerged in which academic labour lawyers have rehearsed the details of the individual judgments concerning the Laval and other cases (Barnard, 2008; Bell, 2008; Bercusson, 2007; Davies, 2008; Eklund, 2006 Eklund, , 2008 Picard, 2008) . The present article does not dissent from the mainly pessimistic conclusions as to the cumulative deleterious effects of the various ECJ judgments for organised labour. While some have previously warned of the possibility of an accelerated 'race to the bottom' in labour standards (Woolfson and Sommers, 2006) , others have argued a more nuanced view, suggesting a greater tractability foe the European 'social dimension' (Donaghey and Teague, 2006; Krings, 2009) . At its most optimistic, the claim has been advanced of efficacy for the European trade union movement in enhancing processes of 'Euro-democratization' (Erne, 2008) . What follows is intended as a contribution to this debate, but suggests a somewhat less sanguine perspective.
For reasons of space, we cannot deal here with all of the key cases and judgments of the ECJ pertaining to free movement of labour and the provision of services, but we would argue that our analysis embraces a common thrust arising from these. In focusing on the Laval case, we follow the approach of Dølvik and Visser (2009) 
Sweden's labour market model
In Sweden, a labour market model has prevailed with strong actors arriving at voluntary agreements in a legally endorsed, but not legislatively mandated, bargaining process over terms and conditions. There is broad agreement on 'rules of the bargaining game' between well-intentioned parties who have an interest in preserving the 'Swedish model' of relatively autonomous self-regulation with minimal state intervention. Since the main actors agreed the rules of the game in a labour accord in 1938, the so-called Saltsjöbaden Agreement, the role of the state has been at most to cast a benevolent eye over industrial relations without the need for extensive legislative intervention (Thörnqvist, 1999) .
Or, at least that was the picture until the early 1990s, when trade union density peaked at 85%. Since then, trade unions in Sweden have undergone progressive decline due to changes in the composition of the workforce, growing decentralisation of collective bargaining, difficulties in recruiting younger workers, and changing contractual forms leading to greater labour market insecurity. Between 1993 and 2005, overall density declined by 9% to 77%, still a remarkably high figure by most international comparisons, although for the blue-collar LO, (the Swedish Trade Union Confederation), the decline has been sharper (Kjellberg, 2007: 260) . The loss of power by the social democratic government in 2006, and the election of a right-of-centre alliance of four parties to government, saw a number of changes introduced which have further adversely affected trade union membership. In particular, the cost of premiums for unemployment insurance funds administered by trade unions has increased, while there has been a reduction in income tax deductions for both trade union membership fees and premium payments. The result has been an acceleration of the previous structural (8)). Third, for those states such as Sweden where it is not possible to declare collective agreements universally applicable, minimum standards/pay can be set by other types of broadly applicable collective agreements (Article 3(8), second subparagraph) that is by collective agreements which are generally applicable to all similar undertakings in a geographical area and industry; and/or by collective agreements which have been concluded by the most representative employers' and labour organizations at national level.
As Sweden had not introduced such generally applicable rules (erga omnes) or statutory provisions on minimum wages, Laval argued that there was no obligation upon it to pay a certain minimum wage. Minimum wages in Sweden are specified only in collective agreements agreed between employers and trade unions, and serve mainly as a starting-point for local negotiations. Laval maintained that it had no obligation to enter into a Swedish collective agreement, since it had concluded two collective agreements with the Latvian Construction Workers' Union (LCA), albeit only after the dispute with the Swedish construction union had begun.
The Labour Court also had to consider whether provisions under Sweden's Lex Britannia clause in the Codetermination Act could be applied to the blockade action of the trade unions.
This clause allowed industrial action to be taken against a company, even where there was an existing (foreign) collective agreement (normally forbidden under the Swedish Codetermination Act), thereby establishing precedence of Swedish collective bargaining agreements over any existing foreign collective agreement. There had been several attempts to set wages lower than the minimum level provided by Swedish collective agreements during the 1980s. These involved shipping companies employing seafarers from low-wage countries, such as the Philippines or Estonia. To avoid 'social dumping', the trade unions, in particular the Swedish Mariners' Union affiliated to the LO, conducted sympathy strikes or placed ships under a portside boycott. The peak of these conflicts came in 1989 with the boycott of the M/S Britannia, a flag-of-convenience vessel with a low-paid Filipino crew, a conflict that ended in the Swedish Labour Court. Lex Britannia was subsequently enacted as an amend-ment to the Codetermination Act giving trade unions the right to take industrial action to improve employment conditions of workers not governed by Swedish agreements on terms and conditions. Such actions were deemed lawful, if the trade union could demonstrate that the activities of a foreign-owned company, permanently or temporarily working in Sweden, enhanced the risk of 'social dumping'. Moreover, the actions were allowed, even if the trade union in question did not have any members at the workplace, and even if there was a valid collective agreement from the company's -or the workers' -home country (Junesjö, 1998) .
In the Laval case, the Swedish Labour Court requested clarification as to whether this provision and the actions of the trade unions at Vaxholm could be seen as being in violation of Community law, specifically, the previously mentioned Articles 12 and 49 of the EC Treaty. For the Swedish trade unions, the core issue at stake was the efficacy national collective bargaining arrangements, and supportive provisions such as 'tie-in' arrangements having the effect of binding non-signatory companies to Swedish labour rates to prevent 'social dumping'. The trade unions had hoped to persuade the ECJ that collective action fell outside the scope of the EC Treaty and therefore, its competence. This, however, was not the view of the Court which framed its adjudication in terms of the 'balancing' of two 'fundamental rights' which could be seen to clash -'that of free movement, and that of collective action, when exercise of the right to strike restricts free movement of services or freedom of establishment' (Ashiagbor, 2008: 235-6) . Article 49 EC must be interpreted as not preventing trade unions from attempting, by means of collective action in the form of a blockade and solidarity action, to compel a service provider of another Member State to subscribe to the rate of pay determined in accordance with a collective agreement which is applicable in practice to domestic undertakings in the same sector…provided that the collective action is motivated by public interest objectives, such as the protection of workers and the fight against social dumping, and is not carried out in a manner that is disproportionate to the attainment of those objectives (para. 309).
The first opinion held, therefore, that a service provider from another European member state should subscribe to provisions of collective agreements in the host country, while collective industrial action taken against such a service provider from another EU country, if conducted in a manner proportionate to the attainment of its objectives, was legitimate. The Swedish trade unions saw this as an indication of future success of their argument with the ECJ. The Swedish employers' confederation, SN, was less enthusiastic, regarding as particularly problematic the question of whether the 'proportionality' of collective action should be a matter determined by the Swedish Labour Court (EIROnline, 2008b) . Here matters remained in legal limbo as the ECJ considered the complex issues at stake before reaching a final judgment.
The European Court of Justice judgment
On 18 December 2007, the ECJ (Grand Chamber) delivered its judgment. It considered two interrelated issues: whether a restriction which the exercise of the fundamental right to strike imposes on free movement could be justified, and whether or not the exercise of this right was 'proportionate' to the objectives which the industrial action sought to achieve. Contrary to the first opinion, the Court ruled that the trade union blockade in order to force Laval to enter into negotiations on pay and sign a Swedish collective agreement, represented a restriction on freedom to provide services under Article 49EC (Case C-341/05, para. 99). The Court argued that such action could be justified in cases where the public interest of protecting workers prevailed. However, it held the view that this was not the case with respect to the Laval dispute. The Court conceded that the blockade served the purpose of protecting Swedish workers against possible 'social dumping', which 'may constitute an overriding reason of public interest' (para. 103). In such circumstances it added, such companies may thereby be forced to respect particular member states' rules on minimum pay. However, with respect to the case in hand:
collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot be justified in the light of the public interest objective…where the negotiations on pay, which that action seeks to require an undertaking established in another Member State to enter into, form part of a national context characterised by a lack of provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards minimum pay (para. 110).
The Court held that the trade unions were precluded from attempting, by means of collective action, to force a provider of services established in another Member State to enter into negotiations on rates of pay constituting more favourable conditions than those resulting from relevant domestic legislative provisions. In the Swedish case, there was an absence of domestic legislative minimum wage provisions providing a clear base line. Minimum wages are not legislatively set down, but emerge through the collective bargaining processes at industry level. Moreover, the specific provisions of Lex Britannia were deemed by the Court to be discriminatory, since it treated foreign employers in the same manner as Swedish domestic employers who had failed to conclude agreements, even if a home state agreement was in place.
In the 'restrictive' view of the Court, the Directive on the posting of workers established only a 'hard core' of provisions, including specified terms and conditions such as health and safety, maximum working hours, minimum paid annual holidays and minimum wages. Effectively, the Court reached the view that the nucleus of mandatory rules for protection of posted workers provided not a starting point for negotiation, but the upper limit or a 'ceiling' for negotiation of terms and conditions Sigeman, 2008: 1140) . Thus, while reaffirming the general right of trade unions to initiate strikes (or actions short of strikes), the Court also determined that the action taken by Swedish trade unions to force Laval to endorse a Swedish collective agreement was disproportionate, and likely to make it 'less attractive' or more difficult as a company from another member state to carry out construction work in Sweden, in other words, to act as a service provider in the internal market. The blockade mounted by the Swedish unions was also deemed disproportionate. As Anne Davies (2008: 141) has pointed out, the manner in which the ECJ used the test of 'proportionality' in the context of Laval in effect 'substantially undermines the significance of the Court's seeming recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right'. The burden of proof falls upon the trade union to demonstrate that its industrial action is 'proportionate' in relation to the employer's freedom of movement. The ECJ's recognition of the right to strike is 'therefore conditional on the satisfaction of the proportionality test' (Davies, 2008: 141) .
This test in the light of the ECJ judgement in Laval will be difficult for trade unions to meet in the context of industrial action to prevent 'social dumping' by employers from within the EU.
The ensuing debate 1
The reactions of the social partners and government to the Laval judgment fed into a broader debate regarding collective bargaining rights and how 'rules of the game' may need to be changed.
The Swedish government
The Laval case began when a Social Democratic government was in office, but following the 
The Employers Confederation (SN)
The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, SN, and its predecessor, the Swedish Employers' Confederation, SAF, had long argued in favour of reducing the scope of trade union industrial action, especially with regard to sympathy action affecting so-called 'third parties' (Duker 2006 ). The Laval case offered a strategic opportunity to re-open this sensitive issue. To this end, the SN had assisted Laval financially as it pursued its case, both in the Swedish Labour 
The Trade Union Confederation (LO)
A bedrock assumption from the standpoint of the Swedish blue-collar Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) LO had been the inviolability of an accession 'promise' made to Sweden when it joined the European Union that the special character of the Swedish labour market model would be maintained. Yet this assurance was not a specific legal instrument within the accession agreement, but rather a letter from the then European Subsequently, it was Byggnads, the construction workers' union, as the union for the sector most detrimentally affected by the judgment, rather than LO that was in the forefront of the debate emerging in Sweden. Torgny Johansson, chairman of Byggnads's local branch in the Stockholm area maintained that all workers within the European Union had to be treated equally, using the metaphor of the 'rules of the game' which had to be the same for both circumstances, similar to other forms of human trafficking (Tilly, 2007) . In a further contribution to the yearbook of the union-friendly think-tank Agora, the construction industry was characterised as a battle-ground for a future deregulated Swedish labour market (Tilly 2008) . In sum, with this partial exception, the response of organised labour to the Laval judgment had been muted.
The Laval Public Inquiry
On 10 April 2008, the Swedish government launched a public inquiry to resolve the legal issues raised by the ECJ (Regeringen 2008 dir. 38) . The remit of the inquiry presupposed the fundamental principle that the main responsibility for pay formation and employment terms and conditions was assigned to the labour market parties, should as far as possible be maintained; yet the EC legislation on freedom of movement of services and the principle of non-discrimination on nationality grounds had also to be fully respected (SOU 2008 # 123) . Their immediate suggestion was to implement a clause on minimum wages for posted workers in all industry-wide collective agreements (Bruun and Malmberg 2008) .
The inquiry, its terms thus set, found that the core of the problem was not the overall Swedish system of labour market regulation based on collective bargaining, but incompatibility between the encompassing rights to take industrial action and the freedom of movement according to the EC law. Hence, the inquiry proposed to limit the right to strike, or take action short of strikes, intended to force foreign-owned enterprises temporarily active in Sweden to conclude agreements with better pay or working conditions than the required minimum for the industry. To assist foreign service providers posting workers to Sweden to access information on prevailing labour market terms and conditions, it was proposed that the Swedish Work Environment Authority act as a liaison office. In effect, trade unions would not be able to attempt to replace collective agreements that were already legally settled in other EU countries by Swedish ones (SOU 2008 # 123; Dagens Nyheter 12 Dec. 2008 ).
The SN, the sharpest critic of the existing framework of trade union rights, immediately declared the proposal 'incomplete'. SN's expert on labour law, Lars Gellner, argued that the suggested amendment to existing law was still not compatible with the ECJ judgment regarding the free mobility of services within the Union, and that the inquiry proposal allowed the possibility for trade unions to take action in matters that should be beyond their rights.
Neither, it was argued, did the Laval inquiry recommendations ensure that foreign companies would be able to estimate prevailing wage rates, a particularly important issue in the construction industry. Moreover, it was also unacceptable that 'discriminating legal regulation' in the form of Lex Britannia should still be in force for companies from outside the European Union and European Economic Area (Svenskt Näringsliv, homepage, 12 Dec.
2008).
The Swedish Trade Union Confederation, LO, was less critical of the inquiry findings, adopting a 'minimalist' defensive posture. For Wanja Lundby-Wedin, as president of LO, but also a powerful figure within the Swedish Social Democratic Party and, wearing a third hat as chairperson of the European TUC, the problem had to be solved at European level by changes in the EC law (LO, homepage, 12 Dec. 2008 ). Yet, critical voices within LO were also raised (12 Dec. 2008 ). According to Claes-Mikael Jonsson, LO jurist and a member of the inquiry's reference group, the problem with 'double contracting' remained; too many foreign companies settled a 'real' individual employment contract with their employees, and a 'fake' contract to show to Swedish trade unions and employers' associations. It was very hard for the unions, Jonsson argued, to prove that a company was 'lying', when it could present papers showing that the workers had wages and working conditions equal to Swedish collective agreement. In other words, a Swedish collective agreement was transparent in a way that, for example, a foreign one, in particular a foreign individual employment contract was not. By a majority of four to three, the Court now found that the actions of the trade unions in mounting the blockade at Vaxholm had violated the fundamental market freedom of Laval to offer its services in Sweden using posted workers and in consequence, the trade union action was deemed illegal. Byggnads and the Swedish Electricians' Union were duly fined 2.63 million Swedish kronor (208,000 Euros) of which 2.13 million kronor was awarded in legal costs incurred by the company. The remaining 550,000 kronor was 'general damages' for the illegal industrial action, to be jointly paid by Byggnads (200, 000 kronor) , the Stockholm branch of Byggnads (200,000 kronor) and the electricians' union (150,000 kronor). The Labour Court rejected Laval's demand that it be compensated for economic damages arising from the trade union action (Arbetsdomstolens Domar, 2009 # 89) 4 . According to the Codetermination Act, the individual participant in a conflict is protected by virtue of her/his belonging to an organization, and the employment contract is still valid during a legal industrial action. Even though the Court found that the blockade violated EC legislation, the action was not considered a 'wildcat' one, and consequently none of the workers involved were subject to damages or legal costs. Three members of the Court, among them the trade union representatives, registered reservations as to the size of the damages.
Even though trade unions found the ruling unfair, there were only minor disagreements with the legal aspects of the decision. The only hint of unfair treatment of the case was suggested by Kurt Junesjö, a jurist formerly connected to the LO, but now retired, although remaining a labour market commentator. According to Junesjö, the chair in the Laval case, Inga Åkerlund, was not as 'neutral' as one could expect in such a case; on the contrary, she had a reputation of judging against the trade unions in 90 per cent of all cases she had been involved in (Junesjö, homepage, Dec. 2009 ). However, as there is no right of appeal to the decisions of the Court, the matter has rested there. 
Conclusion
While in total perhaps no more than 2,000 foreign workers are present in Sweden as posted workers at the time of writing (2009), these migrants, albeit 'temporary', represent the core 'documented' labourforce. Until now, it has been possible for Swedish trade unions to attempt to regulate their terms and conditions. The erosion of the capacity to defend core national labour conditions as a result of the Laval case, while worrying in itself, now opens the way to the 'unprotecting' of migrant 'posted' workers and more particularly of vulnerable undocumented labour on a wider scale. Collaterally, the prospect of a gravitational pull on Swedish labour standards in general is real. It becomes singularly difficult to affirm 'benchmark' collective agreements setting the higher rather than the lower standard. This project was difficult enough to realise even before the Laval judgment (Erne 2008: 90-95) .
After Laval resort to traditional forms of collective action and labour solidarity to defend labour standards at national level has become legally circumscribed. Moreover, in the absence of a minimum threshold of wages at EU level, regulating labour standards through crossborder trade union solidarity also becomes problematical. With the door open to employers from the new EU member states to compete on a European-wide scale on the basis of lowercost labour, the issue of labour standards and 'the race to the bottom' post-Laval, is therefore fundamental to the future preservation of a social dimension to the European project.
The ECJ ruling has thus struck at the very heart of the so-called Swedish model for setting wages and conditions. The ECJ's particular, narrow (and some might argue idiosyncratic) interpretation of the Directive, and, crucially, of Article 3(8), is at the heart of the damage to Swedish national industrial relations autonomy. More generally, the ECJ's approach postLaval flattens out or disregards the complexities of systems of collective bargaining in Member States with their varying mix of wage-setting through combinations of national and sectoral bargaining (Kilpatrick 2009: 853-4) . Moreover, it could be argued that the whole purpose and legislative intention of the Directive on the posting of workers has been undermined. Arguably, post-Laval the flow of discrimination, if such it is, is in the opposite direction, towards foreign service providers. In short, key pillars of the distinctive Swedish model of labour market regulation have now been undermined, if not altogether dismantled.
The only positive note is that following the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, the European Convention and the rulings of the EctHR may hold greater weight and unquestionably affirm a broader view than that of the ECJ. This may offer space for a future legal challenge if the trade unions are ready to make it. 
